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FETAL TISSUE TRANSPLANTATION: ETHICAL AND LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS
by Kimberly Fox Duguay"
Editor's Note: On May 28, 1992, the House of Representatives overwhelmingly approved a three-year
reauthorization for the National Institutes of Health which included a provision restoring federal
funding of fetal tissue research In spite of congressional support, the 260-148 vote is just shy of the
required 2/3 majority for overriding the expected veto by President Bush.
INTRODUCTION
By age fifty-three, Donald Nelson had suffered for twenty years from the muscle rigidity and
tremors often associated with Parkinson's Disease.' In November of 1988, he became the first American
to have the cells of an aborted fetus implanted into one side of his brain.2 This procedure was conducted in
hopes that the fetal tissue would begin to prompt his brain to secrete dopamine, the chemical whose
deficiency causes the symptoms of Parkinson's Disease.3 Since the implant, Mr. Nelson's regular dosage of
medicine has decreased by forty-five percent. He has also regained the use of his left hand and rarely
requires the use of crutches.4
Until recently, there existed little hope for the one million Americans who suffer from
Parkinson's Disease. Previously thought to be untreatable, this is just one of the many conditions which
researchers are studying in relation to fetal tissue transplantation.5 As with other forms of biotechnology,
transplantation of fetal tissue raises a number of complicated issues. This article will focus on fetal tissue
transplant technology, the current state of regulation and surrounding ethical and legal considerations.
OVERVIEW OF THE TECHNOLOGY
Fetal tissue has had a role in medical research since the 19th century.6 During the 1930's,
researchers began to study the biochemical properties of fetal tissue in efforts to find new treatments.7 In
" Kimberly Fox Duguay recently completed a M.SJJ.D. joint degree program at the State University of New York
at Buffalo.
' Freundlich, New Hope for Neurotransplants, Bus. WK., JULY 23, 1990, at69-70.
2 Id.
3 Bauer, Bioethical and Legal Issues in Fetal Organ and Tissue Transplantation, 26 Hous. L. REv. 955, 957
(1989).
4 Freundlich, supra note 1, at 69.
Other conditions include Alzheimer's Disease, blindness, diabetes, epilepsy, hemophelia, leukemia, spinal cord injuries and
Tay-Sachs. Bregman, Conceiving to Abort and Donate Fetal Tissue: New Ethical Strains in the Transplantation Field--A Sur-
vey of Existing Law and a Proposal for Change, 36 UCLAL. REv. 1167, 1168 (1990). The treatment of some forms of cancer,
Huntington's Disease and strokes are also being researched in relation to the use of fetal tissue. Frankowska, Fetal Tissue
Transplants: A Proposal to Amend the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, 4 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1095, 2008 (1989).
6 Burlingame, Commercialization in Fetal-Tissue Transplantation: Steering Medical Progress to Ethical Cures,
68 TEx. L. REv. 213, 223 (1989).
7 Id.
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1954, the Nobel Prize for medicine was awarded to researchers who developed the polio vaccine through
the use of cell lines created from human fetal kidney cells.'
Fetal tissue transplantation is often utilized in the treatment of conditions involving a traumatic
injury or a degenerative process which has destroyed the vital tissue responsible for the production of
hormones, enzymes, and other chemicals necessary for the proper functioning of a healthy body.9 In
treating conditions that involve an affected area, physicians may prescribe drug therapy which includes the
administration of daily doses of the deficient chemical. However, prescription drugs often fail to treat the
underlying disease and sometimes cause undesirable side effects and even death."°
Another alternative for the patient is the utilization of cadavers and living donors to provide
transplantable tissue. However, this is limited because of the shortage of available donors." Fewer than
twenty percent of accident victims become organ donors, it is estimated that over 15,000 Americans are
waiting for organs each day.' 2  Moreover, the cells from these sources are generally incapable of
reproducing. Since adult tissue contains antigens and other chemical markers which cause the recipient's
body to identify them as foreign, a transplant involves a high risk of rejection by the recipient's immune
system. 13
In contrast, the use of fetal tissue has several advantages. Currently, there is no shortage of
available fetal tissue due to the 1.6 million elective abortions which occur annually in the United States.'
4
Many believe that without any practical alternatives, this readily available source of tissue should not be
needlessly discarded." Since fetal tissue is "immunologically naive," it is less likely to possess the
antigens which cause the recipient's immune system to reject the tissue cells. Moreover, it grows far more




9 Id. at 217. In 1988, it was estimated that "as many as 5 million Americans suffering from Parkinson's Disease (1 million),
Alzheimer's disease (2.5 to 3 million), Huntington's disease (25,000), type I diabetes (600,000), stroke (400,000), and spinal
cord injuries (several hundred thousand)" could be helped if the treatments involving fetal tissue transplantation proved to be
successful. Thorne, Regulating Commerce in Fetal Tissue, 26 Soc'Y 61 (1988).
'o See Burlingame, supra note 6, at 217.
" Bauer, supra note 3, at 961.
12 Id. at 962.
" See Burlingame, supra note 6, at 218. Researchers have also attempted to find other sources of transplantable
material which do not create such a high risk of rejection. For example, several research groups have attempted to
transplant the tissue from Parkinson's disease patient's adrenal gland into the patient's own brain in hopes that the
tissue will begin to produce the levels of dopamine which the recipient's brain lacks. Utilizing the patient's own tis-
sue eliminates the risk of rejection while avoiding the ethical dilemmas associated with fetal tissue transplantation.
However, the results of this procedure have been inconclusive. Bauer, supra note 3, at 962.
'" Archibald, Embryonic Enterprises: Researchers Reap Harvest in Abortions, Washington Times, Jan. 6, 1992, at
Al.
It should also be noted that many of the abortions conducted in the United States are conducted with the use of a
vacuum suction machine which destroys much of the tissue, thereby rendering the tissue unusable for research pur-
poses. Dr. Janice Raymond, a medical ethics and women's studies professor at the University of Massachusetts, tes-
tified in front of the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Health in April of 1991 that only 90,000 of the
early aborted fetuses in the United States are fit for use under current fetal tissue transplantation or research practic-
es. Id.
15 Bauer, supra note 3, at 963.
16 Bregman, supra note 5, at 1170. See also Bauer, supra note 3, at 961.
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Researchers have developed processes which cause certain types of fetal cells to proliferate in the
laboratory. This greatly increases the number of recipients who can be treated from a small sample of fetal
tissue.' 7 For example, one biotechnology firm has developed a method making it possible to treat twenty
diabetics from the pancreas cells of a single fetus.'8 In addition to these benefits, cyropreserved fetal cells
have been found to be ninety-eight percent viable for up to two months. 9 Cyropreservation allows
researchers time to make certain they have the correct cells and to test for bacteria and viruses.20
Even though the techniques for fetal tissue transplantation are the same, the type of tissue and its
subsequent placement may vary depending upon the particular disease being treated. The optimal age of
transplantable fetal tissue varies according to the different diseases being treated.2'
The method of abortion may affect the desirability of the fetal tissue. Although a hysterotomy is
the least damaging to the fetus and provides superior tissue, this method poses the greatest health risk to
the woman. On the other hand, dilation and evacuation is more destructive to the fetus and is usually
ineffective in safeguarding the necessary organs for transplant. However, this procedure presents the least
health risk to the woman.22 This creates a dilemma because the woman's safety may be pitted against
extracting usable fetal tissue.
Material for fetal tissue transplantation may come from either elective abortions or spontaneous
abortions (miscarriages). For some people, spontaneous abortions present fewer ethical problems because
they are similar to normal donor situations. In such a situation, the donor's death is not a result of a
purposeful act by the "next of kin" who has the intent to terminate the donor's life.
23
However, because the time and place of a spontaneous abortion is unpredictable, there is increased
difficulty in preserving the fetal tissue. Researchers prefer the fetal tissue from an elective abortion
'" Burlingame, supra note 6, at 221. For example, in search of a treatment for diabetes, researchers at Hana Biolog-
ics have isolated pre-islet cells from pancreatic fetal tissue and have discovered procedures which cause these cells
to multiply in the laboratory. The islet cells are implanted in a fold of fat which connects the patient's "abdominal
viscera with the stomach." The necessity for intrusive surgery is eliminated due to the cells functional independence
from the pancreas, and the estimated time period for this out-patient procedure is fifteen minutes. In addition, since
the use of fetal cells eliminates the risk of rejection by the body's immune system, this procedure may be conducted
without any tissue matching, or the use of immuno-suppressive drugs. Id.
"s Danis, Fetal Tissue Transplants: Restricting Recipient Designation, 39 HASTINGs L.J. 1079, 1085 (1988). In fact,
similar technology is being developed to produce cloned fetal material to supplement aborted material in the produc-
tion of brain cells for the treatment of Parkinson's Disease. Id.
'" Freundlich, supra note 1, at 70. Cyropreservation is a method of "low temperature preservation" which facili-
tates the storage and transportation of fetal tissue. See Burlingame, supra note 6, at 214.
20 Freudlich, supra note 1, at 70. It should be noted that there is some controversy in the medical community that
there may be a risk of transferring some disorder or disease present in the fetal tissue to the recipient. Dr. William
M. Landau, chief of neurology and neurosurgery at the Washington University School of Medicine stated "[A]ny
time one implants potentially infected tissue into someone else's body, then there's always going to be a risk." Ar-
chibald, supra note 14, at Al.
1 Bregman, supra note 5, at 1170. Procedures requiring fetal organs must necessarily utilize older tissue, whereas
the tissue utilized in the treatment of disorders such as Parkinson's disease and diabetes may be between nine and
fourteen weeks. The fetal tissue should not be utilized too young due to researchers' fears that the transplantation
could "result in runaway cell growth resembling that of a brain tumor." Id.
22 See generally Frankowska, Fetal Tissue Transplants: A Proposal to Amend the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, 4
U. ILL. L. REv. 1095, 1098 (1989). A hysterotomy, like a Caesarian section, involves the surgical opening of a wom-
an's abdomen and uterus, and the removal of the fetus. Dilation and evacuation involves a mechanical evacuation of
the uterus by dilating the cervix and removing the fetus through a vacuum tube. Id.
23 Bauer, supra note 3, at 960.
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because the fetal tissue produced by a spontaneous abortion may be adversely affected by the anomaly
which caused the miscarriage.24 Consequently, most of the fetal tissue used for transplantation will come
from elective abortions.2"
CURRENT REGULATIONS
In 1974, the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and
Behavioral Research was established through the passage of the National Research Act.26  This
Commission was charged with the inquiry and examination of fetal research. The goal of its investigation
was to make recommendations to the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare
regarding the conditions under which fetal research should be conducted or sustained by the Department.27
Until this report was completed, Congress issued a moratorium on federally funded fetal research. This
Congressional ban resulted from public criticism of the National Institutes of Health's (NIH) funding of
fetal research.28
In July of 1975, the Commission's recommended guidelines were enacted with minor revisions as
federal regulations and apply to all research funded by the Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS). 29  The regulations distinguish between viable and non-viable fetuses and defer to the States all
regulation pertaining to non-viable fetuses ex-utero.30 They also state that non-therapeutic3' research may
not be conducted on a viable fetus ex-utero and that reasonable efforts must be made to resuscitate viable
fetuses. Moreover, non-viable fetuses may not be artificially maintained until tissue and organs are
removed.32
The regulations mandate the maintenance of a "Chinese Wall" between the persons involved in
the abortion procedures and the persons involved in the fetal research.33 This means that personnel
involved in the abortion counseling and procedures are legally prohibited from becoming involved in the
fetal research. Thus, a woman is protected from any potential manipulation on the part of researchers to
pressure her to have an abortion and/or to donate the fetus.34 In addition, the federal regulations do not
distinguish between spontaneously aborted and electively aborted fetuses.35
24 Id. See also Danis, supra note 18, at 1084.
25 Id.
26 Pub. L. No. 93-348, tit. II, 88 Stat. 342 (1974).
27 See generally Bregman, supra note 5, at 1176.
28 See id.
29 45 C.F.R. § 46 (1975).
30 Id. at § 46.203(d)-(e). See also Specter, Fetal Tissue "Acceptable" for Research, Wash. Post, Sept. 17, 1988, at
Al, col 4.
"' Research may be termed "therapeutic" or "non-therapeutic." Therapeutic research is designed to benefit the sub-
ject involved. Non-therapeutic research is designed to gain general knowledge beneficial to others. R. LEVINE, 2
ETHics AND REGULATION OF CLINICAL RESEARCH 8-9 (1986).
32 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.209(c), 46.209(b)(l)-(3) (1989).
33 Id. at § 46.206(a)(3) (1987).
34 However, under these regulations fetal research is prohibited unless both the mother and father are legally com-
petent and give informed consent. The father's consent is not necessary if his identity is unknown, if he cannot be
reached through reasonable efforts, or if the pregnancy is a result of rape. The requirement for paternal consent pres-
ents several controversial issues surrounding a woman's right to control her body, and the point at which a father's
parental interests in a child should begin. Id.
31 Specter, supra note 30, at A12, col. 2. See generally, Frankowska, supra note 5, at 1104-06.
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In April of 1988, the DHHS once again declared a moratorium on fetal research at the NIH until
an outside committee could analyze the ethical, medical, and legal consequences of future research.36 To
accomplish this task, the NIH appointed the Human Fetal Tissue Transplantation Research Panel
(HFTTR), which consisted of twenty-one persons, including ethicists, biomedical researchers, attorneys,
public policy experts, clinical physicians and religious leaders." In December of 1988, the HFTTR
concluded that funding of fetal research was "acceptable public policy" so long as guidelines were
established to attempt to separate a woman's decision to abort from her decision to donate the fetal tissue.3
However, Dr. Louis Sullivan, Secretary of DHHS, extended the moratorium indefinitely in November of
1989.39
In July of 1991, as part of a bill re-authorizing programs for the NIH, the House of
Representatives passed a bill in a 274-174 vote which includes a provision lifting the ban on
federally-funded fetal research.4" In February of 1992, the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee
approved the bill in a 13-4 vote4' and sent the vote to the Senate which overwhelmingly approved the bill
in an 87-10 vote. However, President Bush has promised to veto the bill.42
Because of the current moratorium, adherence to the 1975 regulations is not mandatory.
Therefore, legal regulation of fetal research is provided by the Uniform Anatomical Gift- Act (UAGA)
which applies to post-mortem gifts. 43 Adopted by all fifty States, the UAGA encourages the donation of
anatomical gifts through the harmonization of applicable state laws."
The Act defines a decedent as "a deceased individual, including a stillborn infant or fetus," but it
does not distinguish between a fetus from a spontaneous abortion and one from an elective abortion.4' The
36 Bregman, supra note 5, at 1177. The ban only allows research to be conducted with fetal tissue from miscar-
riages and from abortions performed to save the mother's life. See Congress: Senate CMTE Votes to End Fetal Tis-
sue Research Ban, AMERCAN POLITICAL NETWORK ABORTION REPORT (Feb. 6, 1992).
17 Childress, Disassociation from Evil: The Case of Human Fetal Tissue Transplantation Research, in SocIAL RE-
SPONSIBILrrY, 32, 37 (1990).
3 Report of the Human Fetal Tissue Transplantation Research Panel, I CONSULTANTS TO THE ADVISORY COMMITrEE TO
THE DREcrOR, NATIONAL INSTITITUTES OF HEALTH (1988), cited in Childress, supra note 37, at 37.
"9 Dr. Sullivan spoke for the Bush Administration stating that he worries that some women who are considering
abortion may be swayed by the idea that their fetal tissue would aid medical research. End the Ban on Fetal Re-
search, N. Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1992, at 28, col. 1. At the time of the moratorium in 1988, the NIH was annually
spending approximately 11.8 million dollars on fetal tissue research. In 1989 and 1990, the spending decreased to
an average of approximately 7.8 million dollars a year. Archibald, supra note 14, at Al.
40 Neuffer, Panel Votes to Lift Ban on Fetal Tissue Use, Boston Globe, Feb. 6, 1992, at 3. Assuming that no repre-
sentative changes her or his vote, all of the remaining sixteen members who did not participate in the initial vote
would be needed to override the President's anticipated veto. See Fram, House OKs Funding for Fetal Tissue Use,
Buffalo News, July 26, 1991, at A4..
4 Neuffer, supra note 40, at 3.
42 President Bush recently authorized government storage of fetal tissue resulting from miscarriages and ectopic
pregnancies. However, critics assert that this is merely a "smoke screen" developed to diffuse Congressional efforts
to overturn the ban on the federal funding of fetal tissue research. See Scanlan, Bush Hedges as Issue Heads Toward
Veto Fight: Critics See "Smoke Screen" in Decision to Keep Ban on Abortion Issue, Buffalo News, May 20, 1992, at
A3.
41 UNIF. ANATOMICAL GiFr AcT, 8A U.L.A. 1-47. Since fetal tissue transplantation is non-therapeutic and involves a
non-viable fetus, under the 1975 regulations many of the safeguards pertaining to fetal tissue transplantation are sup-
plied by the UAGA.
44 Id. at Prefatory Note. See generally Frankowska, supra note 5, at 1106.
41 Id. at § 1(b), 8A U.L.A. 30. See Danis, Fetal Tissue Transplants: Restricting Recipient Designation, 39 HAST-
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UAGA also gives the biological parents the right to donate the fetus.46 However, if either parent objects,
she or he has the power to veto the other parent's decision to donate.47 Although the sale or purchase of
bodily parts is prohibited under the UAGA,4 g the Act permits a donor to designate the recipient.49
To date, twenty-five states have not enacted specific restrictions beyond the UAGA.5 ° The other
twenty-five states have a variety of legislative acts. According to one survey, two states "permit fetal
research of all sorts provided that maternal consent is granted,"' nine states permit research on dead fetuses
under the terms of the UAGA," eight more do the same with very slight modifications,53 and the remaining
six states prohibit non-therapeutic research on dead fetuses if obtained from elective abortions. 5 4 Thus,
state laws applying to fetal research resemble a "patchwork-quilt," ranging from very strict to very
liberal."5
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Fetal tissue transplantation has been highly criticized because of its association with the highly
controversial issues surrounding abortion.56 James F. Childress, a professor of religious studies and of
medical education, notes: "A well-developed ethical theory provides a framework of principles within
which an agent can determine morally appropriate actions."07 Often, a practice or policy may be criticized
NGsL.J. 1079 1089 (1988)..
46 Id. Section 2(b) of the UAGA states that the donor of a fetus may be, in descending order of priority "either par-
ent.., an adult brother or sister.., a guardian of the descendant at the time of his [sic] death.., or any other per-
sons authorized or under obligation to dispose of the body."
47 Section 2(c) of the UAGA prohibits a person from accepting a donation if the donee is aware of one of the par-
ent's opposition.
4' Additionally, Congress enacted the National Organ Transplant Act in 1984 which prohibits the interstate com-
merce of human body parts for "valuable consideration for the use in human transplantation." According to the
drafters of this act, "human body parts should not be viewed as commodities," and organizations and individuals
should be prevented from profiting by their sale. See Frankowska, supra note 5, at 1103.
49 UAGA at § 6(a)(3).
50 See Frankowska, supra note 5, at 1108.
"' These survey results are borrowed from Bregman, supra note 5, at 1180. The states which provide fetal research
with only maternal consent are South Dakota and Tennessee.
52 These states are Kentucky, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming.
s These states are Arkansas, California, Florida, Massachusetts, Michigan, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and Rhode
Island.
14 These states include Arizona, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Ohio, and Oklahoma.
" Bauer, supra note 3, at 977. The most liberal approach was taken by South Dakota in a 1973 statute which
states, "Experimentation with fetuses without written consent of the woman is prohibited." Conversely, Arizona's
1975 statute, which is one of the most narrow, states:
A person shall not knowingly use any human fetus or embryo, living or dead, or any parts,
organs or fluids of any such fetus or embryo resulting from an induced abortion in any manner for
any medical experimentation or scientific or medical investigation purposes except as is strictly nec-
essary to diagnose a disease or condition in the mother of the fetus or embryo and only if the abor-
tion was performed because of such disease or condition.
See Bregman, supra note 5, at 1180.
56 For example, Senator David Durenberger, a Republican from Minnesota and a leading opponent of federal fund-
ing of fetal tissue transplantation, stated, "This debate is about abortion" when referring to the proposed re-
authorization of federal funding for fetal tissue transplants. Quoted in Neuffer, supra note 40, at 3.
57 See Bauer, supra note 3, at 999. Childress was a participant on the HFTTR panel established by the NIH in
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or condemned for its association with another practice or policy which is considered to be morally wrong.5"
For example, some ethicists have analogized the relationship between fetal tissue transplantation and
abortion to the Nazi experiments upon Jews and other prisoners of war.5 9
An English theologian and physicist, John Polkinghome, asserts that the reasons for a woman to
obtain an abortion are complex and "in circumstances of such moral complexity," it is not right to "regard
the termination of pregnancy as inevitably so heinous that any subsequent use of the fetal tissue made
available is morally disqualified." 6
Fetal tissue transplantation has sparked public controversy and evoked a broad spectrum of
responses. The use of fetal tissue is often dependent upon one's view of the fetus itself. If a fetus is
viewed as a "person," abortion is often perceived as murder.6' In such cases, the abuse rests in the "killing
of the baby in the first place," rather than in the use of fetal tissue. 62 For example, a commentary in
Christianity Today written by a woman whose mother suffers from Alzheimer's Disease states, "The
procurement and use of this human fetal tissue to enhance or elongate the life of another human being is
not [sic] simple salvage operation. It is purely and simply cannibalism."63
The opposite view is "tissue is tissue," and the fetus should "not be dignified to a greater degree
than any other tissue which is surgically removed from a woman. '" For example, a mother of a diabetic
girl in Maryland stated, "If the technique were perfected today, I'd hop into bed right now ... I'd kill an
unborn sibling to improve my daughter's life."65
The major reason for extreme reactions to fetal tissue transplants is because of its link to the
highly publicized and heated abortion debate. Often people view the rights and wrongs of abortion and
fetal tissue transplantation as standing or falling together. However, many researchers assert that the use of
fetal tissue should be viewed as separate from the abortion procedure. For example, Polkinghorne outlined
an ethical theory called the "Separation Principle." '  This theory distinguishes the supply of fetal tissue
from its use by developing a parallel between fetal cadavers and homicide victims. Similar to the medical
use of a homicide victim's cadaver, fetal tissue should not be considered immoral because the use is not
1988. Childress, supra note 37, at 37.
58 For example, much debate has surrounded the use of results from Nazi experiments on Jews and other prisoners
of war, including the Dachau hypothermia and phosgene gas experiments. This debate erupted when data from Nazi
phosgene gas experiments was cited in a paper presented at a colloquium sponsored by the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA). Id. at 32.
" Miller, On Transplanting Human Fetal Tissue: Presumptive Duties and the Task of Casuistry, 14 JoutNAL OF
MEDICINE AND PHILOsoPHY 617, 630. James Burtchaell, a respected theologian at Notre Dame University and a mem-
ber of the HFTTR Panel, explains that the researchers who experimented on concentration camp prisoners argued
that they were completely absent from the torture and extermination of victims and that the deaths would have oc-
curred with or without their research. He contends that the researchers' professional presence legitimized and en-
dorsed the activities of the abusers and thereby made them accomplices to the wrongdoing. Nonetheless, comparing
the abhorrent acts performed during the Holocaust with abortion procedures is misplaced because of the failure to
recognize the difference between the attempted genocide of a population and the termination of a being that may po-
tentially achieve "personhood."
60 Quoted in Dickson, Fetal Tissue Transplants Win UK Approval, 245 SCIENCE 464, 465 (1989).
61 See Terry, Politics and Privacy: Refining the Ethical and Legal Issues in Fetal Tissue Transplantation, 66 WASH.
U.L.Q. 523, 524.
62 Id.
63 Fish, The Scandal of Fetal Tissue Research, 34 CHisTANrTy TODAY 26 (1990).
6 Terry, supra note 61, at 524.
65 Morrow, When One Body Can Save Another, Time, June 17, 1991, at 54-58.
66 See D. LAMB, ORGANTkANSPLANTS AND ETHics 75 (1990).
39
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associated with the "crime. '
67
Public overreaction to unfamiliar scientific advances is not a novel phenomenon. It involves
significant moral dilemmas surrounding the conflict between the development of biotechnology and the
maintenance of respect for the sanctity of the human body and potential life. For example, when artificial
insemination was introduced in the 1950's, many ethicists denounced it because they said it "separated
procreation from marriage in a destructive way. 68 Other ethicists argue that while new technologies are
initially disconcerting, when they become more familiar the common sense of society "weeds out potential
horrors. ,69
Although the Supreme Court and state legislatures have upheld the legality of abortion with
varying degrees of constraints, widespread disagreement still exists. This leads critics to argue that the use
of fetal tissue in research and transplantation will result in abortions which otherwise would not occur. °
They believe this potential increase in abortions would be encouraged by "general altruism." This
phenomenon occurs when a woman's motivation to abort stems from the benefit to an unknown recipient.
However, the HFTTR states, "the reasons for terminating a pregnancy are complex, varied, and deeply
personal," and it regards it as "highly unlikely that a woman would be encouraged to make this decision (to
abort) because of the knowledge that the fetal remains might be used in research."'
'
Thus, there is an important distinction between choosing to abort for the purpose of donating the
tissue and choosing to donate to ease the emotional pain associated with the decision to abort. Rather than
choosing to abort solely to benefit an unknown recipient, it is more plausible that a woman will donate
after deciding to terminate a pregnancy so that the fetal tissue may serve a useful purpose. For example, a
medical research foundation in California instructed nurses to ask women who were already scheduled for
abortion if "they would allow researchers to use the tissue in experiments that may lead to discoveries for
better treatments for persons with chronic diseases. '72 The survey reported that ninety-two percent of the
women agreed, stating that it would enable "some good" to result from their decision to abort.73
In addition, some critics of fetal tissue transplantation claim that the use of fetal tissue for
research purposes legitimizes abortion. They believe that women who are ambivalent about their decision
to abort will favor abortion due to the research benefits.74 A logical flaw exists in the argument that fetal
research represents a societal endorsement of abortion. The conclusion is that organ donations by
homicide victims should be prohibited because this will be viewed as a societal endorsement of murder.
Another criticism of fetal tissue donation is that some women may be persuaded to abort as a
result of familial and emotional pressures to help a loved one.7' A woman may decide to become pregnant
with the intention to abort or she may terminate an existing pregnancy so that she can donate the tissue to
help an ailing friend or relative. This motive may be referred to as "specific altruism" because it is
67 See id.
68 Morrow, supra note 65, at 57. In addition, Pope Pius XII denounced artificial insemination even between hus-
band and wife. He declared, "To reduce the cohabitation of married persons and the conjugal act to a mere organic
function for the transmission of the germ of life would be to convert the domestic hearth, sanctuary of the family,
into nothing more than a biological laboratory." Id.
69 Id.
70 Childress, supra note 37, at 39.
7' Quoted in id. at 38.
72 Lawton, Fetal-Tissue Transplants Stir Controversy, 32 CHRIsmL1w TODAY 52 (1988).
73 Id.
71 See Burlingame, supra note 6, at 236. According to this logic, the donation of organs from suicide victims
should be banned if they were ambivalent about their decision to end their lives.
7 See Bregman, supra note 5, at 1189.
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directed towards a "specific, known, and usually loved individual." '76
Even though the HFTTR prohibits women from designating the recipient when donating tissue to
federally-flnded research, the current ban on federally funded research nullifies this provision. At this
time, HFTTR regulations are adhered to on a voluntary basis, and thus, the UAGA continues to permit
individuals to make directed donations. This creates a risk that women will be exploited and pressured into
making donations to family members."
Similar to abortion, the concept of viability is an important dimension in the donation of fetal
tissue. In 1973, Roe v. Wade7' extended the fundamental right to privacy to include a woman's right to an
abortion. Under Roe, there is no legal distinction between a woman's choice to abort an accidental
pregnancy and a woman's choice to abort a pregnancy intentionally conceived for donation. However, a
woman's right to an abortion is not absolute. The state has an "important and legitimate interest in
preserving and protecting the health of the pregnant woman" in addition to "protecting the potentiality of
human life."79 The state's interest increases as the pregnancy progresses. Under Roe, the state's interest in
the protection of the fetus becomes compelling at the point of viability which occurs at approximately the
end of the second trimester.
Since Roe, the Court has wavered in its trimester based viability standard. Justice O'Connor
stated in Colautti v. Franklin 0 that the point of viability should remain flexible "for anticipated
advancements in medical skill."' In a more recent decision, Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,
2
the Court recognized a state interest in the well-being of the fetus. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote a
separate opinion criticizing the "rigid" trimester framework which stated that testing a fetus at twenty
weeks to determine viability is constitutional.8 3 The trimester framework appears to be on fragile ground,
and thus, the point of viability may eventually be determined by the development of a medical standard
rather than a legal one.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Since the ban on federal funding for fetal research continues, the UAGA represents the most
logical vehicle for a proposed amendment and therefore would provide the most widespread impact on
current practices utilizing fetal tissue." In order to combat some of the social and ethical concerns
surrounding the use of fetal tissue for medical and research purposes, two amendments to the UAGA
should be implemented. First, the UAGA should be amended to include a provision which prohibits
designating a recipient of the fetal tissue. If a woman is not able to designate the recipient, her ability to
directly affect a loved one's treatment will be eliminated. In addition, prohibiting donors from specifying a
recipient will discourage pregnancies motivated with the intent to donate the fetal tissue. 5
76 Childress, supra note 37, at 39.
77 See id.
78 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
79 Id. at 153.
80 439 U.S. 379 (1979).
81 Id. at 387. See generally Bauer, supra note 3, at 991.
82 492 U.S. 490, 109 S.Ct. 3040 (1989).
83 Rehnquist wrote that the trimester approach has resulted in "a web of legal rules, resembling a code of regu-
lations rather than a body of constitutional doctrine." Id. at 3044.
84 See Frankowska, supra note 5, at 1115.
85 Frankowska states, "This amendment would remove the incentive for a woman to become pregnant for the pur-
pose of supplying tissue, or, if accidentally pregnant, to choose to abort for this purpose. Id. at 1117.
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Secondly, more specific criteria should be developed to determine viability. Recent advances in
medical technology have redefined the stage at which viability may occur. Although the Supreme Court
will ultimately be responsible for altering the legal trimester framework, the UAGA should develop
specific medical guidelines to determine at what point a fetus can be used for research purposes. Since
viability depends upon medical advancements and the rate of a fetus's development, criteria should be
established to protect both the integrity of the fetus and the research.
The moratorium on federal funding of fetal tissue research should be lifted. In addition, the
federal regulations should be amended to include government quality control standards which ensure the
safety and integrity of the fetal tissue."6 If the federal regulations were implemented, the effectiveness of
the Commission's recommendations would be greatly increased.
CONCLUSION
Fetal tissue transplantation evokes various responses. These reactions are a result of the
important interests at stake: 1) the woman's interest in controlling her own body, 2) the recipient's interest
in receiving life-saving treatment, and 3) the state's interest in protecting a viable fetus. There are also
important societal implications as to whether fetal tissue donation should be a personal choice or whether
the government should intervene and/or entirely prohibit the use of fetal tissue.
Although one may logically separate the various issues and claim their independence from one
another, it is extremely complicated to separate the logical argument from its emotional components. If a
person believes that abortion is morally wrong, it may be very difficult for that person to condone the use
of fetal tissue from elective abortions. It would require one to emotionally separate her or his feelings
about abortion from the beneficial use of fetal tissue.
In this author's opinion, when no clear public consensus exists and several interest groups are
involved, ultimate decision-making should reside with the individual. However, some government
regulation is needed, such as prohibiting experimentation on the fetus while it is still "alive." This is
clearly justified to prevent "freedom of choice" from becoming "freedom to abuse." However, the balance
between personal choice and the governmental regulation is delicate and difficult to maintain, especially
when there are highly publicized "horror stories" which cause elective officials to respond with legislative
backlash. 7
New medical technologies to treat conditions such as Alzheimer's Disease and diabetes have vast
societal implications. Although fetal tissue transplantation is not a new practice, many surrounding issues
have yet to be resolved. In order to preserve the moral integrity of an enlightened society, society needs to
consider the promotion of technological advancements and the protection of women's constitutional right
to privacy and procreative choice. Resolution of these issues is dependent upon further research to allow a
more accurate estimation of potential technological advances and upon further ethical debate to weigh the
potential benefits against the potential detriments.
86 The University of Minnesota has conducted an ongoing study by twenty-five doctors and health professionals
from various fields of medicine and biomedical ethics. This study is "the only systematic examination to date of
worldwide fetal tissue practices." According to the first phase report, there are currently no government quality con-
trol standards for fetal tissue, and there is only limited testing for infectious agents. Archibald, supra note 14, at Al.
87 Legislative response to public outcry due to a highly publicized event is not always negative. For example, the
NIH proposed guidelines entitled "Protection of Human Subjects: Policies and Procedures" in November of 1973
was done in response to public outrage over a Yale-New Haven experiment in which a live male fetus was dissected
without anaesthesia. See Bregman, supra note 5, at 1175-76.
